Equine Law Matter - Closed - Get Information, Read Court Documents

TERESA ALBRlCI, Plaintiff v. JENNIFER SPARKS, D.V.M., and TOBY EWING, D.V.M., dba EQUINE VETERINARY ASSOCIATES; LARSON PERFORMANCE HORSES, LLC and LUCKY 13 RANCH, LLC Defendants

No. 11-2-12259-0 SEA
COMES NOW, Plaintiff Teresa Albrici for Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint against Defendants Jennifer Sparks, D.V.M. and Toby Ewing, D.V.M., dba Equine Veterinary Associates (Defendants Sparks and Ewing, collectively, the “Vet Defendants”), Larson Performance Horses, LLC (“Defendant LPH”) and Lucky 13 Ranch, LLC (“Defendant Lucky 13.”)( Defendant Lucky 13 and Defendant LPH collectively, the “Trainer Defendants”), by and through her attorney, Rachel E. Kosmal McCart of Equine Legal Solutions, PC, and alleges as follows.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
1.
At all times mentioned herein, the Vet Defendants were doctors of veterinary medicine licensed to practice in Washington, doing business as Equine Veterinary Associates.
2.
At all times mentioned herein, Defendant Sparks was acting in her capacity as a licensed doctor of veterinary medicine.
3.
At all times mentioned herein, Equine Veterinary Associates was a general partnership, and each of the Vet Defendants was a general partner of Equine Veterinary Associates.
4.
At all times mentioned herein, Defendant Sparks was acting on behalf of the partnership known as Equine Veterinary Associates.
5.
At all times mentioned herein, Defendant LPH was a Washington limited liability company with its principal place of business in Arlington, Washington. At all times mentioned herein, Defendant LPH was in the business of providing professional training and care of show horses.
6.
At all times mentioned herein, Defendant Lucky 13 was a Washington limited liability company with its principal place of business in Arlington, Washington. At all
times mentioned herein, Defendant Lucky 13 was in the business of providing boarding and care of horses.
7.
At all times mentioned herein, Kip Larson was a professional horse trainer, a member of Defendant LPH and a member of Defendant Lucky 13.
8.
On or about July 2008, Plaintiff purchased a 2004 American Paint Horse gelding named “Donald Trump” (the “Horse”). Defendant LPH advised Plaintiff regarding the purchase and acted as Plaintiff’s agent in the purchase transaction. Plaintiff purchased the Horse for the sum of $100,000 and paid Defendant LPH a commission of $10,000.
9.
During the period from on or about July 2008 through on or about December 2009, the Trainer Defendants had possession of the Horse. During such period, Defendant Lucky 13 provided board and care for the Horse, and Defendant LPH provided professional training and related services for the Horse.
10.
During the period from on or about July 2008 through on or about December 2009, Plaintiff visited the Trainer Defendants’ place of business in Arlington, Washington approximately once per week to visit the Horse and take lessons from Defendant LPH. During such period, Defendant LPH also transported the Horse to horse shows, and Plaintiff periodically met Defendant LPH at such horse shows.
11.
During the period from on or about July 2008 through on or about November 2008, the Trainer Defendants observed that the Horse was periodically lame in his front limbs. The Trainer Defendants did not inform Plaintiff about such lameness. Alternatively, the Trainer Defendants did not fully and accurately inform Plaintiff of the nature, severity and frequency of the lameness.
12.
On or about November 20, 2008, Dr. Mike Howell, D.V.M., of Evergreen Equine Veterinary Practice, performed a lameness examination of the Horse. Dr. Howell performed the examination at Defendant LPH’ s request.
13.
Dr. Howell diagnosed the Horse with “solar/caudal heel pain intermittent,” prescribed “Shoe w/pads & 2 gr Bute … x 5 days,” and recommended that the Horse be re-examined in two weeks. Defendant LPH was present at the examination.
14.
Dr. Howell billed Plaintiff directly for his services. When Plaintiff received the invoice, Plaintiff asked Defendant LPH about the examination. Defendant LPH failed to fully and accurately inform Plaintiff of the reasons for the examination, or of Dr. Howell’s findings. Defendant LPH also failed to provide Plaintiff with a copy of Dr. Howell’s examination report.
15.
During the period from on or about November 2008 through on or about December 2008, the Horse was periodically lame in his front limbs. The Trainer Defendants failed to inform Plaintiff about such lameness. Alternatively, the Trainer Defendants did not fully and accurately inform Plaintiff of the nature, severity and frequency of the lameness. During such period, the Trainer Defendants did not arrange
for Dr. Howell to re-examine the Horse.
16.
On or about December 3, 2008, Defendant Sparks performed a lameness examination of the Horse. Such examination was undertaken at Defendant LPH’ s request, and Defendant LPH was present during the examination.
17.
Defendant Sparks diagnosed the Horse with “Right front on again/off again lameness. Today grade 2/5 right front. Suspect bruising to heel. Radiographed clean.” Defendant Sparks prescribed “Starting on Isox, and Bute and see if bruising resolves. If not, recommend MRI to rule out soft tissue injury.”
18.
Plaintiff received invoices from Equine Veterinary Associates for Defendant Sparks’ examination and associated medications prescribed by Defendant Sparks. Plaintiff asked Defendant LPH about the examination and medications. Defendant LPH failed to fully and accurately inform Plaintiff about the reasons for the examination, or of Defendant Sparks’ findings. Defendant LPH also failed to provide Plaintiff with a copy of Defendant Sparks’ examination report.
19.
During the period from on or about December 2008 through December 2009, the Horse was periodically lame in his front limbs. The Trainer Defendants did not inform Plaintiff of such lameness. Alternatively, the Trainer Defendants did not fully and accurately inform Plaintiff of the nature, severity and frequency of the lameness. The Trainer Defendants did not arrange for any veterinarians to examine the Horse during such time period, and did not arrange for the Horse to receive an MRI.
20.
On or about November 2009, Defendant LPH inquired whether Plaintiff was interested in selling the Horse to another client of Defendant LPH. Plaintiff declined to sell the Horse because the proposed sale price was substantially lower than Plaintiffs original purchase price.
21.
On or about December 2009, Defendant LPH inquired whether Plaintiff was interested in selling the Horse to Katherine Dalzell. Defendant LPH advised Plaintiff that Ms. Dalzell wished to purchase the Horse for her teenaged daughter. Plaintiff authorized Defendant LPH to negotiate the sale on Plaintiff’s behalf.
22.
On or about December 2009, Defendant Sparks performed a pre-purchase examination of the Horse on behalf of Ms. Dalzell. Defendant LPH was present at such examination.
23.
At Ms. Dalzell’s request, Defendant Sparks sent the Horse’s radiographs to Dr. Mark Revenaugh, D.V.M., for review. On or about December 16,2009, Dr. Revenaugh examined such radiographs and issued a written report of his findings, which included a notation about “3lucentlsynovial channels” in the Horse’s right front foot and questioned whether the channels were an “artifact.” Dr. Revenaugh also commented that the skyline view radiographs were “difficult to read/interpret” due to “artifacts.” Defendant Sparks did not take any additional radiographs of the Horse.

24.

Equine Veterinary Associates charged Ms. Dalzell $2,574.62 in connection with such examination. Dr. Revenaugh also charged Ms. Dalzell in connection with his radiographic consultation. Upon information and belief, Ms. Dalzell paid all such charges.

25.
On or about December 2009, Plaintiff sold the Horse to Ms. Dalzell for the sum of $125,000. Defendant LPH acted as Plaintiff’s agent in the sale transaction and Plaintiff paid Defendant LPH a sale commission of $12,500.
26.
On or about January 2010, Ms. Dalzell’s horse trainer, Shannon McCulloch, contacted Defendant LPH and reported that the Horse was lame in his front limbs.
27.
On or about February 2010, on behalf of Ms. Dalzell, Dr. Revenaugh performed a lameness examination of the Horse, including a bone scan, ultrasound and radiographs. Dr. Revenaugh’s findings included, among other items, “inflammation of the bilateral front navicular bones with ‘wear & tear’ of the bilateral front DDF tendons.” Dr. Revenaugh treated the Horse with shockwave therapy and injected the Horse’s left front and right front coffin and navicular joints, among other areas. Dr. Revenaugh also treated the Horse with Tildren.
28.
On or about September 2010, Plaintiff heard that Ms. Dalzell’s daughter was no longer interested in horse showing and that the Horse might be offered for sale. Plaintiff asked Defendant LPH to act as her agent in a transaction to purchase the Horse. Plaintiff advised Defendant LPH that she would only purchase the Horse if the Horse “passed” a thorough pre-purchase veterinary examination. At no time did Defendant LPH advise Plaintiff that the Horse had a history of lameness issues (other than as reported by Ms. McCulloch on or about January 2010). At no time did Defendant LPH advise Plaintiff to purchase the Horse. At no time did Defendant LPH advise Plaintiff to negotiate a purchase price for the Horse that was lower than Ms. Dalzell’s asking price of $125,000. At no time did Defendant LPH act on behalf of Plaintiff to attempt to negotiate a purchase price for the Horse that was lower than Ms. Dalzell’s asking price of $125,000.
29.
On or about September 2010, Defendant LPH contacted Defendant Sparks on Plaintiff’s behalf for the purpose of engaging the Vet Defendants to perform a pre-purchase veterinary examination of the Horse for Plaintiff.
30.
Defendant LPH informed Defendant Sparks that Plaintiff intended to use the Horse as a high-level Western Pleasure show horse. Defendant LPH also informed Defendant Sparks that Plaintiff had previously owned the Horse.
31.
Defendant LPH informed Defendant Sparks that the Horse had been examined and treated for lameness issues during Ms. Dalzell’s ownership. Defendant LPH also infonned Defendant Sparks that Plaintiff was concerned about the Horse’s soundness. As described herein, Defendant Sparks had also previously examined and treated the Horse for lameness.
32.
Acting on Plaintiff’s behalf, Defendant LPH requested that Defendant Sparks perform a thorough pre-purchase examination of the Horse, including a lameness evaluation. As part of such examination, Defendant LPH requested that Defendant Sparks take radiographs of the Horse’s feet and legs. Defendant LPH also requested that Defendant Sparks take a blood sample from the Horse and have the sample tested for anti-inflammatory drugs.
33.
On or about Sunday, September 12, 2010, Defendant Sparks performed a pre-purchase examination of the Horse (the “Exam”) in Momoe, Washington. Defendant LPH was present during the Exam.
34.
Prior to the Exam, Defendant Sparks did not request or review veterinary records for the time period that the Horse belonged to Ms. Dalzell. Alternatively, Defendant Sparks received and reviewed such records prior to the Exam.
35.
During the Exam, Defendant Sparks took digital radiographs of the Horse’s front feet fetlock joints, hock joints and stifle joints. Defendant Sparks also performed a lameness evaluation of the Horse and obtained a blood sample from the Horse.
36.
On the date of the Exam, Defendant Sparks advised Defendant LPH that the Horse was sound and in good physical condition. Defendant LPH conveyed this information to Plaintiff and advised Plaintiff to purchase the Horse.
37.
Defendant Sparks did not advise Defendant LPH that the results of the Horse’s blood testing would not be available until several days after the Exam, and that the Exam was incomplete without such blood test results. Alternatively, Defendant Sparks advised Defendant LPH that the results of the Horse’s blood testing would not be available until several days after the Exam, and that the Exam was incomplete without such blood test results, but Defendant LPH failed to so inform Plaintiff.
38.
Prior to advising Plaintiff to purchase the Horse on or about September 2010, Defendant LPH did not review copies of the Horse’s veterinary records for the time period that the Horse belonged to Ms. Dalzell. Alternatively, Defendant LPH reviewed such records, but did not discuss their contents with Plaintiff or Defendant Sparks. Alternatively, Defendant LPH reviewed such records and discussed them with Defendant Sparks, but did not discuss them with Plaintiff.
39.
On or about September 14, 2010, Plaintiff purchased the Horse for the sum of $125,000. In making such purchase, Plaintiff relied upon the professional opinions of Defendant Sparks and Defendant LPH. Plaintiff paid Defendant LPH a commission of $12,500 on the sale.
40.
On or about September 15, 2010, Tmesdail Laboratories, Inc. received the blood sample from the Horse taken by Defendant Sparks during the Exam. On or about September 17, 2010, Tmesdail Laboratories, Inc. provided Defendant Sparks with a written report showing that the Horse’s blood sample tested positive for 0.4 micrograms/ml of phenylbutazone.
41.
Phenylbutazone is an anti-inflammatory drug that is available only by prescription and commonly administered to horses for the purpose of pain relief.
42.
On or about September 17, 2010, Defendant Sparks prepared a written report of the Exam (the “Exam Report”). Defendant LPH did not request or receive a copy of the Exam Report. Alternatively, Defendant LPH received a copy of the Exam Report, but did not provide Plaintiff with a copy of the Exam Report.
43.
On at least two occasions during the period from on or about September 17, 2010 to on or about December 2010, Plaintiff telephoned the Vet Defendants’ office and requested a copy of the Exam Report However, the Vet Defendants did not deliver a copy of the Exam Report to Plaintiff until on or about December 2010.
44.
The Exam Report stated, “Shod: Yes Aluminum bar shoes.” The Exam Report also stated, “[the Horse] is wearing bar shoes.” Farriers typically use bar shoes for the purpose of relieving pressure on horses’ heels. Heel pain is a common symptom of navicular disease. At no time during the Exam did Defendant Sparks inquire about the purpose of the Horse’s bar shoes.
45.
Defendant LPH was aware that the Horse was wearing bar shoes at the time of the Exam. Alternatively, Defendant LPH should have been aware that the Horse was wearing bar shoes at the time of the Exam. Defendant LPH did not inform Plaintiff that the Horse was wearing bar shoes at the time of the Exam. Defendant LPH did not inquire of Ms. McCulloch or any other party about the reasons why the Horse was shod with bar shoes.
46.
The Exam Report also stated, “Comment on feet. Donald appears to be very overdue for shoeing. His feet are very long and at inappropriate hoof angles.” The Exam Report also stated, “[H)as been in regular work/showing consistently with current owner and trainer.” Horses in regular work and showing consistently are not typically “very overdue for shoeing.” Such horses also do not typically have feet that are “very long and at inappropriate hoof angles.” At no time during the Exam did Defendant Sparks inquire about the reasons for the condition of the Horse’s feet.
47.
Defendant LPH was aware that that the Horse’s feet were not in good condition at the time of the Exam. Alternatively, Defendant LPH should have been aware that the Horse’s feet were not in good condition at the time of the Exam. Defendant LPH did not inform Plaintiff that the Horse’s feet were not in good condition at the time of the Exam. Defendant LPH did not inquire of Ms. McCulloch or any other party about the reasons why the Horse’s feet were not in good condition.
48.
The Exam Report stated, “A full prepurchase was done last December and full radiographs were taken and reviewed by Dr. Mark Revenaugh at the time of purchase.” The Exam Report stated, “Radiographs were taken of front feet, fetlocks, hocks and stifles. These were compared to films from last December and there were negligible changes.”
49.
The Exam Report stated, “Prepurchase evaluation went very well. This gelding appears very healthy and sound at this time.”
50.
The Exam Report did not include the results of tests performed on the Horse’s blood sample. Defendant Sparks did not communicate with Plaintiff or Defendant LPH about the test results until on or about the last week of September 2010. Alternatively, Defendant Sparks informed Defendant LPH about the test results prior to the last week of September 2010, and Defendant LPH did not so inform Plaintiff.
51.
From on or about September 15, 2010 through on or about December 9, 2010, the Trainer Defendants had possession of the Horse. During such period, Defendant LPH provided professional training and care for the Horse, and Defendant Lucky 13 provided board and care for the Horse.
52.
During the period from on or about September 15, 2010 through on or about December 9, 2010, the Horse exhibited intermittent front foot lameness. The Trainer Defendants did not inform Plaintiff about such lameness. Alternatively, the Trainer Defendants did not fully and accurately inform Plaintiff about the nature, frequency and severity of such lameness. The Trainer Defendants did not seek veterinary attention for the Horse during this period. The Trainer Defendants administered anti-inflammatory drugs to the Horse during this period. Alternatively, Defendant LPH administered anti- inflammatory drugs to the Horse during this period.
53.
On or about mid-September 2010, acting on behalf of Plaintiff, Defendant LPH transported the Horse to an American Paint Horse Association approved horse show in Albany, Oregon. The Horse exhibited intermittent signs of front foot lameness during the show. Such lameness negatively affected the Horse’s performance. Defendant LPH administered anti-inflammatory drugs to the Horse before and during the show. Defendant LPH did not inform Plaintiff about such lameness. Alternatively, Defendant LPH did not fully and accurately inform Plaintiff of the nature and severity of such lameness.
54.
On or about late October 2010, acting on behalf of Plaintiff, Defendant LPH transported the Horse to an American Paint Horse Association approved horse show in Waco, Texas. The purpose of attending such show was to prepare the Horse for the American Paint Horse Association World Championship Show. At the Waco show, the Horse exhibited intermittent signs of front foot lameness. Such lameness negatively affected the Horse’s performance. Defendant LPH administered anti-inflammatory drugs to the Horse before and during the show. Defendant LPH did not fully and accurately inform Plaintiff of the nature and severity of such lameness.
55.
On or about early November 2010, acting on behalf of Plaintiff, Defendant LPH transported the Horse to the American Paint Horse Association World Championship in Fort Worth, Texas. Acting upon Defendant LPH’s advice, Plaintiff had entered the Horse in several classes at the show. However, the Horse consistently exhibited signs of front foot lameness during the show. Defendant LPH administered anti-inflammatory drugs to the Horse before and during the show. Due to lameness, the Horse was able to compete in only one of the classes in which Plaintiff had entered him. The Horse’s lameness also caused him to be eliminated during the preliminary round of this class.
56.
On or about December 9, 2010, Plaintiff moved her horses, including the Horse, out of the Trainer Defendants’ care and into the care of Teresa Pelton, another professional horse trainer. Ms. Pelton began providing professional training and care for the Horse on Plaintiff’s behalf. When exercised, the Horse showed consistent signs of front foot lameness. Ms. Pelton immediately advised Plaintiff of such lameness and recommended that the Horse be examined by a veterinarian.
57.
On or about January 6, 20I I, at Ms. Pelton’s request, Meg Brinton, D.V.M. examined the Horse on Plaintiff’s behalf. Dr. Brinton reported that the Horse was “lame on the [left front] 2/5 circling on the lunge line at the trot when going to the left and 3/5 lame when circling to the right”
58.
Dr. Brinton found, “There is effusion in both coffin joints worse on the right side. Radiographs from Sept 2010 were provided by Jennifer Sparks office. The navicular bone is abnormally shaped on lateral view on the left front but the detail is difficult to interrupt on DV and skyline because of lack of packing of the frog. Views were retaken today which confirm the abnormal shape of the navicular bone on the left front and confirm a lucency on the nav bone on the right front. The flexor cortex is roughened as well.”
59.
Dr. Brinton referred Plaintiff to Washington State University Veterinary Teaching Hospital for further diagnosis of the Horse and a “possible neurectomy.”
60.
During the period from January 24-27,2011, Robert Schneider, D.V.M, M.S., Professor of Equine Orthopedic Surgery at Washington State University Veterinary Teaching Hospital, examined the Horse on Plaintiff’s behalf.
61.
On or about January 27, 2011, Dr. Schneider provided Plaintiff with a written report of his findings. Such report stated that Dr. Schneider diagnosed the Horse with “[e]nd stage navicular disease, bilateral front feet with adhesions between the navicular bone and the deep digital flexor tendon in both feet.” The report also stated, “The prognosis for this horse returning to soundness is poor due to the degeneration of the navicular bone and the adhesions between bone and tendon.”
62.
Dr. Schneider’s report also stated, “Unfortunately, I do not have a treatment for this horse that will return this horse to regular use and riding. In my experience horses with adhesions between the navicular bone and deep flexor tendon do not have a treatment that will allow them to return to use.” Dr. Schneider’s report further stated, “I also believe the horse is not a good candidate for a pahnar digital neurectomy because the neurectomy lasts a very short time when horses with end stage navicular disease are treated. When the neurectomy is performed in horses like this, it desensitizes the area, however the adhesions between the navicular bone and the deep flexor tendon will continue to cause tearing of the deep flexor tendon … Frequently this occurs in just a few weeks time following the neurectomy.”
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE
(Against Defendant Sparks and Defendant Ewing)
63.
Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 62 above.
64.
Acting as a licensed doctor of veterinary medicine, Defendant Sparks owed a duty to Plaintiff to act in conformity with applicable professional standards.
65.
Defendant Sparks breached such duty by failing to act in conformity with applicable professional standards.
66.
Defendant Sparks’ breach was the proximate cause of harm to Plaintiff.
67.
Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of such harm.
68.
While committing the above-described breach, Defendant Sparks was acting as an agent for Equine Veterinary Associates. The Vet Defendants were each general partners of Equine Veterinary Associates at the time of Defendant Sparks’ above-described breach. Therefore, the Vet Defendants are each jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff for the damages incurred by Plaintiff as a result of the breach.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
NEGLIGENCE
(Against Defendant Sparks and Defendant Ewing)
69.
Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 68 above.
70.
Plaintiff engaged Defendant Sparks to perform certain services on Plaintiffs behalf. Accordingly, Defendant Sparks owed Plaintiff a duty of care in performing such services.
71.
In performing services for Plaintiff, Defendant Sparks failed to exercise a reasonable degree of care.
72.
Defendant Sparks’ failure to exercise a reasonable degree of care was the proximate cause of harm to Plaintiff.
73.
As a result of such harm, Plaintiff suffered damages.
74.
While committing the above-described breach, Defendant Sparks was acting as an agent for Equine Veterinary Associates. The Vet Defendants were each general partners of Equine Veterinary Associates at the time of Defendant Sparks’ above-described breach. Therefore, the Vet Defendants are each jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff for the damages incurred by Plaintiff as a result of the breach.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
BREACH OF CONTRACT
(Against Defendant Sparks and Defendant Ewing)
75.
Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges Paragraphs I through 74 above.
76.
Plaintiff entered into an oral contract with Defendant Sparks. Pursuant to such contract, Defendant Sparks agreed to perform certain services for Plaintiff, and Plaintiff agreed to pay Defendant Sparks for such services.
77.
Plaintiff fully performed Plaintiffs obligations pursuant to the contract.
78.
Defendant Sparks’ performance of services pursuant to the contract was deficient. Such deficiency constituted a material breach of contract.
79.
Defendant Sparks’ material breach of the contract caused harm to Plaintiff.
80.
As a result of such harm, Plaintiff suffered damages.
81.
Defendant Sparks entered into the above-described contract with Plaintiff on behalf of Equine Veterinary Associates. The Vet Defendants were each general partners of Equine Veterinary Associates at the time of Defendant Sparks’ above-described breach. Therefore, the Vet Defendants are each jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff for the damages incurred by Plaintiff as a result of the breach.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
VIOLATION OF RCW 19.86.20
(Against Defendant LPH)
82.
Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 81 above.
83.
Section 19.86.020 of the Revised Code of Washington provides, “Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.”
84.
Defendant LPH’s conduct, as described herein, constitutes “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” within the meaning of RCW 19.86.020.
85.
Plaintiff has been injured by Defendant LPH’s unfair or deceptive acts or practices.

86.

Section 19.86.090 of the Revised Code of Washington provides, “Any person who is injured in his or her business or property by a violation of RCW 19.86.020 … may bring an action in superior court to … recover the actual damages sustained by him or her … together with the costs of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. In addition, the court may, in its discretion, increase the award of damages up to an amount not to exceed three times the actual damages sustained: PROVIDED, That such increased damage award for violation of  RCW 19.86.020 may not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars.”

87.
Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks the award of actual damages as well as Plaintiffs costs of bringing suit and attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff also requests that the court award increased damages of $25,000 to Plaintiff.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
BREACH OF CONTRACT
(Against Defendant Lucky 13)
88.
Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 87 above.
89.
Plaintiff entered into an oral contract with Defendant Lucky 13. Alternatively, Plaintiff entered into a written contract with Defendant Lucky 13. Pursuant to such contract, Defendant Lucky 13 agreed to perform certain services for Plaintiff, and Plaintiff agreed to pay Defendant Lucky 13 for such services.
90.
Plaintiff fully performed Plaintiffs obligations pursuant to the contract.
91.
Pursuant to the contract, Defendant Lucky 13 agreed to act as Plaintiff’s agent with respect to the Horse’s board and care. Implied in such agency contract was a duty to keep Plaintiff reasonably informed about the Horse’s condition. Defendant Lucky 13 materially breached such duty by failing to keep Plaintiff reasonably informed about the Horse’s condition.
92.
Defendant Lucky 13 ‘s material breach of the contract caused harm to Plaintiff.
93.
As a result of such harm, Plaintiff suffered damages.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
BREACH OF CONTRACT
(Against Defendant LPH)
94.
Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 93 above.
95.
Plaintiff entered into an oral contract with Defendant LPH. Alternatively, Plaintiff entered into a written contract with Defendant LPH. Pursuant to such contract, Defendant LPH agreed to perform certain services for Plaintiff, and Plaintiff agreed to pay Defendant LPH for such services.
96.
Plaintiff fully performed Plaintiff’s obligations pursuant to the contract.
97.
Pursuant to the contract, Defendant LPH agreed to act as Plaintiff’s agent with respect to the Horse’s training and care. Implied in such agency contract was a duty to keep Plaintiff reasonably informed about the Horse’s condition. Defendant LPH materially breached such duty by failing to keep Plaintiff reasonably informed about the Horse’s condition.
98.
Implied in the contract between Plaintiff and Defendant LPH was a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As described herein, Defendant LPH breached such implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and such breach was material.
99.
As Plaintiff’s agent, Defendant LPH owed Plaintiff a duty of loyalty. Defendant LPH breached such duty of loyalty by acting in a manner inconsistent with Plaintiff’s interests, as described herein. Such breach was material.
100.
Defendant LPH’ s above-described material breaches of the contract caused harm to Plaintiff.
101.
As a result of such harm, Plaintiff suffered damages.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
NEGLIGENCE
(Against Defendant LPH)
102.
Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges Paragraphs 1 through 101 above.
103.
Plaintiff engaged Defendant LPH to perform certain services on Plaintiffs behalf. Accordingly, Defendant LPH owed Plaintiff a duty of care in performing such services.
104.
In performing services for Plaintiff, Defendant LPH failed to exercise a reasonable degree of care.
105.
Defendant LPH’ s failure to exercise a reasonable degree of care was the proximate cause of harm to Plaintiff.
106.
As a result of such harm, Plaintiff suffered damages.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays this Honorable Court for the following relief:
Professional Malpractice
Against Defendant Sparks and Defendant Ewing, jointly and severally:
1. For a judgment that awards Plaintiff damages in an amount to be proven trial, which in no event will be less than $139,847.94; and
2. For an award of Plaintiff’s costs herein incurred; and
3. For an award of Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees; and
4. For interest on all portions of any judgment at the legal rate from the judgment is entered until such amounts are paid; and
5. For such other and further relief as the Court deems fair and just
Negligence
Against Defendant Sparks and Defendant Ewing, jointly and severally:
1. For a judgment that awards Plaintiff damages in an amount to be proven trial, which in no event will be less than $13 9, 84 7. 94; and
2. For an award of Plaintiff’s costs herein incurred; and
3. For an award of Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees; and
4. For interest on all portions of any judgment at the legal rate from the judgment is entered until such amounts are paid; and
5. For such other and further relief as the Court deems fair and just.
Breach of Contract
Against Defendant Sparks and Defendant Ewing, jointly and severally:
1. For a judgment that awards Plaintiff damages in an amount to be proven trial, which in no event will be less than $139,847.94; and
2. For an award ofPlaintiff’s costs herein incurred; and
3. For an award of Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees; and
4. For interest on all portions of any judgment at the legal rate from the date a judgment is entered until such amounts are paid; and
5. For such other and further relief as the Court deems fair and just.
Unfair Trade Practice in Violation of RCW 19.86.020
Against Defendant LPH:
1. For a judgment that awards Plaintiff actual damages in an amount to be proven at trial, which in no event will be less than $139,847.94; and
2. For an award of additional damages in the amount of$25,000 or such other amount as the Court deems fair and just; and
3. For an award of Plaintiff’s costs herein incurred; and
4. For an award of Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees; and
5. For interest on all portions of any judgment at the legal rate from the date a judgment is entered until such amounts are paid; and
6. For such other and further relief as the Court deems fair and just.
Breach of Contract
Against Defendant Lucky 13:
1. For a judgment that awards Plaintiff damages in an amount to be proven at trial, which in no event will be less than $139,847.94; and
2. For an award of Plaintiff’s costs herein incurred; and
3. For an award of Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees; and
4. For interest on all portions of any judgment at the legal rate from the date a judgment is entered until such amounts are paid; and
5. For such other and further relief as the Court deems fair and just
Breach of Contract
Against Defendant LPH:
1. For a judgment that awards Plaintiff damages in an amount to be proven at trial, which in no event will be less than $139,847.94; and
2. For an award of Plaintiffs costs herein incurred;
3. For an award of Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees;
4. For interest on all portions of any judgment at the legal rate from the date a judgment is entered until such amounts are paid; and
5. For such further and other relief as the Court deems fair and just.
Negligence
Against Defendant LPH:
1. For a judgment that awards Plaintiff damages in an amount to be proven at trial, which in no event will be less than $139,847.94; and
2. For an award of Plaintiffs costs herein incurred;
3. For an award of Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees;
4. For interest on all portions of any judgment at the legal rate from the date a judgment is entered until such amounts are paid; and
5. For such further and other relief as the Court deems fair and just.
DATED this 15th day of August, 2011
EQUINE LEGAL SOLUTIONS, PC
Rachel E. Kosmal McCart

View Albrici Amended Complaint 

 

View Defendants’ Ewing & Sparks Answer 

 

View Defendant Larson Performance Horses Answer

 

View Defendant Lucky 13 Answer

 

April 2012 – Suit dismissed with prejudice and without costs to any party